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The United States Supreme Court has handed down a once in a generation 
patent law decision that will have important ramifications for the patentability of 
non-physical methods, both internationally and in Australia. In Bilski v Kappos, 
the Supreme Court considered whether an invention must either be tied to a 
machine or apparatus, or transform an article into a different state or thing to be 
patentable. It also considered for the first time whether business methods are 
patentable subject matter. The decision will be of particular interest to 
practitioners who followed the litigation in Grant v Commissioner of Patents, a 
Federal Court decision in which a Brisbane-based inventor was denied a patent 
over a method of protecting an asset from the claims of creditors. 
 
Bilski v Kappos is the United States Supreme Court’s first substantive review of the 
patentable subject matter standard since it confirmed the patentability of computer 
software programs that cause a physical transformation of matter in Diamond v Diehr 
in 1981. In Bilski v Kappos, the Supreme Court considered whether the patent 
eligibility standard contains a requirement that an invention must either be tied to a 
machine or apparatus, or transform a particular article into a different state or thing. It 
held that it does not, finding that the “machine-or-transformation test” formulated by 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (‘Federal Circuit’) below is not the sole 
test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible process. In doing so, it 
dispensed with any suggestion that the patentable subject matter test involves a 
physicality requirement. 
 
The subject matter before the court was a controversial and distinctly contemporary 
attempted use of the patent system. Bilski’s patent application involves claims to a 
method for managing (or hedging) the consumption risks associated with selling a 
commodity at a fixed price. It differs markedly from the mechanical and chemical 
based inventions that have traditionally been regarded as the domain of patent 
protection, and is therefore an attempt to the redraw the bounds of what has 
traditionally been considered to be patentable subject matter. 
 
The United States Patentable Subject Matter Standard 
 
Section 101 describes the subject matter that may be patented in the United States 
under the Patent Act. 
 
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.” 
 
Section 101 specifies four independent categories of inventions or discoveries that are 
eligible for protection. These are processes, machines, manufactures, and 
compositions of matter. The Supreme Court has explained previously that: “In 
choosing such expansive terms… modified by the comprehensive “, any” Congress 
plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.”1 Congress took 
this approach to patent eligibility to facilitate the philosophy that “ingenuity should 
receive a liberal encouragement.”2 
 
In conjunction with these four categories, the Supreme Court has also recognised 
categories of excluded matter. These are, “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and 
abstract ideas.”3 While these exceptions are not expressed in the legislation, they are 
consistent with the wording of section 101, which states that a patentable process 
must be both “new and useful.” 
 
Reconsidering the Machine-or-Transformation Test 
 
In Re Bilski,4 the Federal Circuit sought to create a test that could be applied to 
determine whether a patent applicant has made claims that pre-empt the use of a 
fundamental principle or an abstract idea or whether those claims cover only a 
particular application of a fundamental principle or abstract idea. The court held by 
majority that the sole test for determining subject matter eligibility for a claimed 
process under § 101 is that:  
 
(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or  
 
(2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.5 
 
The court labelled this physicality requirement the “machine-or-transformation test”. 
It described the test as a bright line delineation between patentable subject matter and 
the recognised categories of excluded matter. Applying this new test, the Federal 
Circuit held that Bilski’s claims are unpatentable.  
 
In a powerful dissenting opinion, Newman J criticised the majority, arguing that the 
test is not supported by the statutory language of § 101, not consistent with existing 
Supreme Court precedent, fails to keep up with changes in new technologies, and ties 
patent eligibility to technologies of a bygone era.6 
 
The Supreme Court 
 
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed that Bilski’s hedging method is not patentable 
subject matter. As was to be expected, the decision in Bilski v Kappos largely falls on 
the interpretation of the Supreme Court’s earlier trilogy of patentable subject matter 
cases, Gottschalk v Benson,7 Parker v Flook,8 and Diamond v Diehr.9 The difficulty 
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in interpreting these earlier cases and applying them to modern conditions is that they 
involve the patentability of technologies of a bygone era, and it is not immediately 
obvious how they are to be applied to innovations in the realm of information 
processing, business methods and other non-physical methods. The court attempted to 
do so by reading them in such a way as to be true to the guiding principle that the 
patentable subject matter standard must remain flexible enough to respond 
appropriately to new innovation as and when it presents itself. 
 
The decision contains three separate opinions. The linkages between the opinions are 
complicated, particularly as to Scalia J’s position. Kennedy J authored the court’s 
opinion, in which Roberts CJ, Thomas and Alito JJ, joined in full; Scalia J joined the 
opinion except as to two parts dealing with the application of the patentable subject 
matter standard to new and emerging technologies of the Information Age. Thus, 
Kennedy J’s opinion is the majority opinion, except as to those two parts. Stevens and 
Breyer JJ both wrote concurring opinions, in which they agreed with the decision of 
the court, but differed as to the reasons. Stevens J wrote a lengthy concurring opinion, 
issued the day of his retirement from the Supreme Court, in which Ginsburg, Breyer 
and Sotomayor JJ joined. Breyer J, even though he joined Stevens J’s opinion, wrote a 
separate concurring opinion, in which Scalia J joined in part. Breyer J, seemingly in 
an attempt to create some degree of certainty from the court’s disparate views, sought 
to highlight the consistencies between the various judgments.  
 
There are five main points to take from the case. 
 
1. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the view that the machine-or-
transformation test is the sole test for determining whether an alleged invention is 
patentable subject matter (thereby rejecting the Federal Circuit’s physicality 
requirement). 
 
2. The court was less than unanimous on the question of whether business methods 
are patentable, the issue being split in favour of a slender 5:4 majority. Five of the 
nine judges were of the view that business methods are not an excluded category of 
subject matter. The remaining four took of the view that they are. 
 
3. The court by a slender majority (5:4) held that Bilski’s claims are unpatentable 
because they are ‘abstract’ (without, as Stevens J noted in his concurring opinion, 
explaining why). The remaining four judges preferred to reject the claims on the basis 
that they are a business method and are thus unpatentable on that basis.  
  
4. Four of the judges did not endorse the controversial State Street “useful, concrete, 
and tangible result” test,10 while a majority of five rejected it outright. The Federal 
Circuit below had also rejected this formulation as being inappropriate to determine 
patent eligibility. 
 
5. The effect of the decision is largely limited to the patent-eligibility of non-physical 
business methods. It will have little impact on the patent eligibility of other 
contentious areas of technology such as computer software, methods of medical 
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diagnosis and treatment, and developments in the field of biotechnology, all of which 
have the potential to come before the Supreme Court in the near future. 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision, while helpful in the sense that it dispels the imprudent 
notion that patent law involves a physicality requirement, offers little clarity as to how 
to determine whether an invention that is not embodied in a physical artefact, or does 
not involve a physical transformation of matter, falls within the scope of patentable 
subject matter. 
 
While the court rejected the notion of a physicality requirement, it did not provide 
guidance as to how the difficult cases involving patents over non-physical business 
methods are to be resolved. Similarly, it provides no guidance as what the scope of 
the recognised categories of excluded matter is in this regard, or how the excluded 
categories are to be applied. 
 
Of particular difficulty is ascertaining why Bilski’s claimed invention was deemed to 
be abstract by Kennedy J and those who concurred in his judgment. On this point his 
Honour says little more than that the hedging method is analogous to patents the 
Supreme Court has previously rejected in cases such as Gottschalk v Benson and 
Parker v Flook: 
 
“Even though petitioners’ application is not categorically outside of §101 
under the two broad and atextual approaches the Court rejects today, that does 
not mean it is a “process” under §101. Petitioners seek to patent both the 
concept of hedging risk and the application of that concept to energy markets. 
Rather than adopting categorical rules that might have wide-ranging and 
unforeseen impacts, the Court resolves this case narrowly on the basis of this 
Court’s decisions in Benson, Flook, and Diehr, which show that petitioners’ 
claims are not patentable processes because they are attempts to patent 
abstract ideas. Indeed, all members of the Court agree that the patent 
application at issue here falls outside of §101 because it claims an abstract 
idea.” 
 
Kennedy J’s categorisation of the claims as “abstract” is unsatisfactory because it 
does not explain how this conclusion was reached. The claims describe a series of 
steps a person should take to achieve a particular useful result. If Kennedy J took the 
view that the claims were described with such a lack of particularity so as to 
constitute only abstract ideas, then he should have said so. 
 
As Stevens J noted this in his concurring opinion: 
 
“The Court, in sum, never provides a satisfying account of what constitutes an 
unpatentable abstract idea. Indeed, the Court does not even explain if it is 
using the machine-or-transformation criteria. The Court essentially asserts its 
conclusion that petitioners’ application claims an abstract idea. This mode of 
analysis (or lack thereof) may have led to the correct outcome in this case, but 
it also means that the Court’s musings on this issue stand for very little.” 
 
Stevens J, the author of Parker v Flook and the dissenting opinion in Diamond v 
Diehr, argued that the court should “restore patent law to its historical and 
constitutional moorings”. On the patentability of business methods, Stevens J 
provided a number of reasons why these are not the sorts of methods that have 
traditionally been recognised and protected by the patent system. He was also of the 
view that business methods are not the sort of innovation that the United States patent 
system was designed to protect. Kennedy J, on the other hand, did not share this view, 
preferring to recognise that the scope of patent protection is of broader import. 
 
Relevance to Australia 
 
The decision will be of interest to practitioners in Australia because it directly 
contradicts the Federal Court’s finding in Grant v Commissioner of Patents 
(‘Grant’)11 that the patentable subject matter test involves a physicality requirement. 
Given that Australian courts have shown themselves to be quite willing to follow the 
direction provided by United States courts in the area of patent law,12 it will be 
interesting to see how the Australian courts respond to the decision in Bilski v 
Kappos. 
 
In 2006, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Grant introduced a 
physicality requirement into Australian law when it considered the patentability of a 
non-physical business method. The alleged invention in Grant involves a means of 
structuring a financial transaction to protect an individual’s assets from the claims of 
creditors. 
 
The Full Court held that, where process patents are concerned, “[a] physical effect in 
the sense of a concrete effect or phenomenon or manifestation or transformation is 
required” for patentability.13 The court thus upheld the rejection of the patent on the 
grounds that it claims a method devoid of any physical connection to the real world. 
While it has been argued that this physicality requirement is inconsistent with existing 
High Court precedent the Full Court was bound to follow and is therefore not good 
law,14 it is the case that for the time being, Grant represents the accepted law in this 
country. However, given the United States Supreme Court’s views, and the 
similarities between Australia and United States patent law, there is cause for the 
courts in Australia to carefully reconsider this finding.  
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The Federal Court in Grant was also of the view that there is no prohibition on 
patenting business methods in Australia so long as the methods involve the use of a 
physical device or are in some way physically transformative. The patentability of 
business methods in Australia, as in the United States, is by no means a certain 
proposition given the split views on this issue demonstrated in Bilski v Kappos. 
 
Finally, both the Supreme Court’s and the Federal Circuit’s rejection of the State 
Street approach to determining patentable subject matter, the “useful, concrete and 
tangible result” test, must cause the Federal Court to reconsider its endorsement of 
that now defunct approach as good law.15 A consequence of the Federal Circuit’s 
about-face (now approved by the Supreme Court) is that the Federal Court of 





Although the decision is clear as to the continuing applicability of the machine-or-
transformation test, it is remarkably inconclusive on the application of abstract ideas 
as a category of excluded matter. It also creates uncertainty as to whether business 
methods will be included as a recognised category of excluded matter. 
 
As to the effect on Australian jurisprudence, I predict that when they get the 
opportunity, the Australian courts will largely mimic the decision in Bilski v Kappos. 
They will do so by overruling Grant and casting aside the physicality requirement it 
created in the same way the United States Supreme Court cast aside the mandatory 
nature of the machine-or-transformation test. It is my view that the physical effect or 
transformation test established in Grant will remain in Australian law as a guide to 
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